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Introduction 
Gross National Happiness (GNH) has only recently appeared on the 
international stage, yet it was immediately met with sympathy by scholars, 
political activists, and politicians around the world. What is the reason for 
this strong appeal of this concept? 
In a historical perspective, the reason is probably a disillusionment 
with the broken promise of economic growth to truly improve people’s lives 
and bring about a more equitable society. After a multifold increase of Gross 
National Product in many societies thanks to almost continuous economic 
growth over more than a century, even the wealthiest societies are still 
plagued by grave social problems like unemployment, child poverty, stress 
etc., and they are disappointed that the hoped-for benefits of economic 
growth largely failed to materialize. 
In a philosophical perspective, however, the reason for the sympathy 
extended to GNH seems to be based on an—intuitive or conscious—ethical 
endorsement of GNH as being conducive to good development, with 
“good” understood in a comprehensive, ethical sense. This implies that in 
order to endorse GNH, one must already have a normative frame of 
reference which allows one to make such a judgment in the first place. The 
question that arises then is if GNH is, or can be conceptualized as, an 
exhaustive concept of good development that entirely fills in the ideal 
notion of good development, or whether GNH is just one aspect of good 
development that has to be complemented by additional normative 
concepts in order to appropriately substantiate the idea of good 
development. 
Whatever the answer to this question, the merit and the potential of 
GNH to serve as a development concept is worth being investigated. To do 
so, the meaning of GNH has to be specified since no generally accepted 
interpretation seems to exist. This is not only a disadvantage of course as 
this conceptual openness invites a constructive debate on what GNH should 
stand for and how it should be operationalized. These two—essentially 
ethical—questions will be at the center of this paper. 
The paper is structured as follows: chapter two will discuss the nature 
of happiness and its relation to human behavior and decision making in 
order to shed light on the relationship between happiness and ethics. I will 
then briefly present my understanding of (deontological) ethics in chapter 
three before examining the relationship between happiness and economic 
growth on the basis of empirical evidence. Chapter five will propose a 
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particular interpretation of GNH and relate it to the concept of good 
development. Chapter six will point out some implications of my 
interpretation of GNH for its operationalization before I synthesize the main 
arguments into five succinct statements in the conclusion. 
Happiness, Human Behavior, and Ethics 
At least since Thomas Hobbes, the belief that people’s behavior and 
choices are motivated ultimately and exclusively by the desire to experience 
a maximum of happiness has gained wide currency not only in the social 
sciences but in popular wisdom as well. In economics, this belief in 
“psychological hedonism” has been particularly influential and practically 
became the anthropological basis of economic theory as a whole. As a 
deterministic model of human decision making, it allows economists to 
subject human behavior to rigid, quantitative analysis. 
While I shall not concern myself much with the peculiarities of 
economic theory, I will use psychological hedonism as a reference point to 
clarify my understanding of happiness and of its connection with ethics. 
Happiness 
Even though every language seems to have a word for happiness 
or satisfaction and people from all cultures apparently have no 
difficulty understanding its meaning—albeit with slightly different 
nuances—, the idea of happiness defies a precise definition. Depending 
on context and perspective, happiness may be understood in a variety 
of ways. For the purpose of this paper, a distinction between an 
empirical and a normative concept of happiness appears appropriate. 
The empirical concept of happiness falls into the domain of psychology 
where the term “subjective well-being” (SWB) has been coined to describe 
an individual’s subjective, self-reported overall happiness as expressed 
along a one-dimensional scale. To preempt the most frequent source of 
mistaken skepticism, it is crucial to appreciate the meaning of the attribute 
‘subjective’. It means that SWB really is the unquestioned perception of each 
individual himself taken at face value, rather than a normative concept of 
“actual well-being”. When it is stated, for example, that the SWB of person 
A is higher today than it was yesterday, this does not—at least not 
necessarily—mean that this person is actually faring better today than he 
was yesterday (i.e., “faring better” in a normative sense of ‘quality of life’). It 
does mean, however, that he judges his well-being more favorably today 
than he did yesterday. SWB alone, therefore, does not suffice to tell us how 
happy an individual is in an absolute, moral sense (in the remainder I will 
refer to this as “actual well-being” or as “the happiness we actually value”). 
SWB is not meant to replace such ethical concepts as eudaimonia (Aristotle 
1998), the good life, or quality of life (Nussbaum & Sen 1993). Of course, it is 
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plausible to suppose that SWB is closely correlated with “actual well-being.” 
Indeed, once SWB data are interpreted in a specific context, one may find 
compelling arguments for specific conclusions about “actual well-being”. As 
long as one is looking at raw data, however, SWB should simply be taken at 
face value, namely a subject’s statement on her perceived degree of well-
being. In this sense, subjective well-being is a fairly objective concept. While 
the data themselves rely on subjective assessments by the respective 
respondents, the methodology is perfectly objective and independent of any 
researcher’s personal evaluations. 
As a normative concept, on the other hand, happiness requires not only 
an instantaneous positive mental experience, but also the reflected approval 
of its propriety by the respective person herself in the presence of all 
relevant information. Happiness in this sense will be called “happiness that 
is actually valued”, or “valued happiness” for short, and it is to be 
understood as a judgment. To illustrate what this entails, consider the 
thought experiment of a happiness machine that can give you pure and 
unlimited pleasure for an arbitrarily long period (Nozick 1989). What is 
more, this machine generates not just dull pleasure but the perfect illusion 
of happiness. The person connected to this machine will experience a perfect 
illusion of friendship, love, good music, delicious food etc. and will actually 
believe to be happy for these reasons, completely unaware of being locked 
into that machine. There would be no negative side-effects of using this 
machine and its use would not imply any costs, nor would it be addictive.  
Imagine a person uses the machine while mourning the death of a 
friend. Even if, while using the machine, he forgets about his friend’s 
demise and experiences pleasure, we certainly would not call this person 
happy because the happiness we actually value is more than the sensation 
as such. Happiness is inseparable from the particular reason that makes us 
feel happy (Spaemann 1989: 41, 73) and in this sense it is not an end that is 
achieved through means (which would not have any intrinsic value) but 
rather a symptom that indicates that a person has some intrinsically 
valuable reason for being happy. When we are happy for a friendship, for 
example, we do not only care about the effect this friendship has on our 
psychic well-being, but also and primarily about the friendship itself as the 
reason for our happiness. Similarly, we do not only want to experience love, 
we want to actually be loved—and we even hate to experience love that is 
just pretended. Put differently, we do not only want the pleasure generated 
by the feeling to be loved, we also want this love to be genuine, to actually 
be the case (Nozick 1989: 106). In the same vein, someone who finds out 
about her husbands’s infidelity is not unhappy for having discovered it but 
for his being unfaithful. In short, the sensation of happiness is not separable 
from its underlying reason. The event that makes me feel (un)happy is not 
the substitutable cause of my happiness but its irreplaceable content 
(Spaemann 1989). 
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Understanding happiness this way does not mean to look down upon 
spontaneous pleasure for the sake of an “intellectualized” concept of 
happiness. Pleasure, which I understand here as an immediate, pre-
reflective positive mental experience (such as enjoying tasty food, listening 
to music one likes etc.), is in itself valuable and needs no moral justification. 
Nevertheless, for pleasure (as a pre-reflective experience) to become 
happiness, (as a judgment), the person must at least not morally disapprove 
of the experience she finds pleasurable—a vegetarian, e.g., might stop 
enjoying his food when he discovers that it contains meat, even though he 
would otherwise enjoy the taste. 
The distinction between the empirical concept of happiness as SWB 
and the normative concept of happiness as “valued happiness” is best 
understood as a distinction between a solipsist and a self-transcendental 
perspective. In the solipsist perspective, the person cares only about his 
inner mental states as recorded in some pleasure center within his brain and 
is entirely indifferent with respect to both (i) the reasons that bring about 
these inner mental states and (ii) anything that does not become part of his 
experience (and hence does not influence his inner mental state). Such 
solipsism is in fact the distinguishing feature of hedonism in general (not 
only psychological hedonism as a specific hapothesis). In the self-
transcendental perspective, by contrast, a person is seen as caring also about 
(i) and (ii) and as in this sense transcending his self. 
Linking Happiness with Ethics 
The link between happiness and ethics can be thought of as twofold, 
making a distinction along the lines of the classical separation between 
teleological ethics—basically the “private” questions of the good life, of who 
I want to be and how I want to live—and deontological ethics—the “social” 
question of legitimacy, of one’s rights and duties vis-à-vis other moral 
subjects. 
Psychological hedonism, to take up my point of departure, supposes a 
very mechanical relationship between happiness and ethics. With respect to 
teleological ethics, it says, first, that happiness is the only thing that counts 
when it comes to choosing who one wants to be and how one wants to live, 
and, by implication, that the things from which a particular person derives 
happiness are predetermined by nature and therefore beyond this person’s 
own will. To use economic terminology, a person is assumed to simply 
have, rather than choose, a consistent set of preferences which provides the 
algorithm to calculate, in any given situation, the optimal decision, i.e., the 
decision that will maximize her happiness. The kind of rationality involved 
here is purely instrumental rationality, i.e., it is a matter of optimization 
with respect to a given end. 
With respect to deontological ethics, the deterministic nature of 
psychological hedonism renders the very idea of rights and duties 
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meaningless because one cannot sensibly demand from predetermined 
beings (which resemble a clockwork more than a person) to behave in 
another way than that which they are programmed to follow, the reason 
being that morality as such requires indeterminacy of human behavior. In 
general, therefore, whether others are affected by one’s choices or not, 
psychological hedonism claims that an individual’s decisions are always 
and exclusively the deterministic manifestation of one’s preferences, 
whatever these happen to be. Thus, psychological hedonism subscribes to a 
solipsist conception of the person and does not know the concept of 
morality. 
In a self-transcendental perspective, by contrast, the teleological 
question of the good life is not a matter of maximization. In this perspective, 
it is strictly impossible to maximize happiness, even if it was proclaimed as 
one’s strategy, because people simply do not from the outset dispose of a 
given set of preferences. Rather, they have to choose and continuously 
reaffirm, or revise, their preferences without knowing which selection of 
preferences will leave them happiest. Having no pre-established set of 
preferences, there is no way they can optimize their choice. Instead they will 
have to decide by virtue of their free will, i.e., by volitional rationality, 
which preferences they consider worth having. This is pretty much what 
people colloquially mean when they say that they have to decide what they 
really want. This choice is in a fundamental sense indeterminate and 
unpredictable and, by its very nature, cannot be explained in the same 
causal way as decisions of instrumental rationality. 
Furthermore, in terms of deontological ethics, the very idea that people 
are so dominantly motivated by a concern for being happy (or avoiding 
unhappiness) seems to be overly rigid and far removed from our everyday 
experiences. For example, economists typically explain the phenomenon 
that people spend effort and time in order to cast their vote in political 
elections, despite knowing that their vote will make virtually no difference 
to the overall outcome, by a motivation to avoid the pain of a bad 
conscience that would result from a good citizen’s failure to vote. This 
argument, however, raises the question why somebody who failed to vote 
would have a bad conscience, and why she would want to be a good citizen 
in the first place. Why would such a person not just get rid of this 
“preference for voting”, given that she does not benefit from it anyway. An 
economist might continue assuming the presence of some higher-order 
preferences, but ultimately would have to concede that he can only assume, 
but not explain, the presence of such preferences. In a self-transcendental 
perspective, by contrast, voting would be explained—to the extent it is 
explainable—by an intrinsic motivation to act in accordance with those 
moral principles which one has found to be irrefutable. Of course, living up 
to these principles will most often be a reason for a person to feel satisfied, 
but then only as a symptom of one’s successful commitment to one’s 
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principles, rather than its cause or motivation (cf. above p. 84). Or more 
generally, as Frankl (1978) put it: rather than seeking happiness, we seek a 
reason to be happy, and the more we directly chase after happiness rather 
than after a reason for happiness, the more we get removed from it. 
“Happiness cannot be pursued, it must ensue” (Frankl 1978: 228). 
Defenders of psychological hedonism might claim that this postulate is 
entirely speculative and cannot be falsified (and hence would not qualify as 
a scientific theory in the sense of Popper [1959/1934]). Such critics would be 
perfectly right with this claim, but should not overlook that the same is true 
for psychological hedonism as well, and in fact for any anthropological 
decision theory. One simply cannot do without such speculation when 
theorizing about human behavior. What I attempted to show is merely that 
the speculative assumptions of psychological hedonism have little 
plausibility because they imply that people are completely determined and 
have no free will, while the—equally speculative—assumptions of the self-
transcendental conception of behavior are closer to our self-perception as 
autonomous persons who act upon reasons rather than being pushed 
around by causes. 
To the degree people have a free will, then, they can actually choose 
different preferences than those they actually hold at a given point in time. 
To be sure, human beings cannot choose their preferences entirely 
arbitrarily. The natural liking of sweet and distaste for bitter tastes, for 
example, can apparently not be reversed at discretion. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be some scope to choose our preferences—we can, so to speak, 
learn to like our coffee with or without sugar. When our preferences are not 
just about the sugar in our coffee but about things that affect other people, 
this is where deontological ethics comes in. A murderer, to illustrate this 
point with an extreme example, must be acquitted by the defenders of 
psychological hedonism because, in their view, his lethal preferences were 
forced upon, rather than chosen by, him (through his genetic disposition 
and environmental influences). When it is believed that human beings have 
a free will, however, he can be held responsible for not having chosen more 
benign preferences (or for having failed to contain his wicked preferences), 
because he could have refrained from killing; there was nothing, in 
particular no preference map, that forced him to kill. Positively speaking, a 
socially responsible person will, in this view, act responsibly not in order to 
feel good. Rather, she will feel happy because her successful living up to her 
moral principles and her sharing in the happiness of others are reasons for 
her to feel so, and this is so because she has come to accept these moral 
principles as irrefutable. Why she has adopted these benevolent principles 
while others have not done so may partly be due to education, socialization 
etc., but ultimately remains a matter of an indeterminate free will and is 
therefore beyond complete causal explanation. 
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Two major conclusions follow from these considerations: first, that 
individual well-being is not a static function ingrained in human nature but 
an ultimately free judgment dependent on the values and preferences a 
person has chosen. This implies—as is also supported by empirical 
happiness research—that favorable life circumstances are just a necessary, 
and not sufficient, condition for happiness and that happiness ultimately 
springs from a human mind. “Happiness is not something that happens to 
people but something that they make happen” (Csikszentmihalyi 1999). 
Second, the human capacity to make free decisions entails the duty to 
make only such decisions that are legitimate. Among free individuals, 
others always are entitled to demand from me a revision of my preferences 
if these, or rather the actions they engender, violate their respective rights. 
Taken together, this means that a society—or a government, or a family—
should not see as its aim the promotion of happiness for its own sake (e.g., 
by distributing feel-good pills), but rather the creation of conditions and the 
transmission of values that allow people to find legitimate reasons for 
happiness. 
Ethics: The Moral Point of View  
The previous references to ethics raise the question what exactly is 
understood here under such concepts as ‘morality’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘rights’, 
and ‘duties’. In what follows, I will give a rough indication of my 
understanding of deontological ethics—i.e., the legitimacy dimension of 
ethics, leaving aside the teleological dimension of ethics for the moment—
which is rooted in discourse ethics as developed by K.-O. Apel and 
J. Habermas. For a more elaborate treatment the reader is referred to the 
relevant literature. 
Systematically speaking, deontological ethics is the scientific discipline 
that reflects on morality and the possibility of the universal validity of moral 
principles. Morality, in turn, is the specific, disinterested attitude that 
submits the pursuit of one’s personal interests, which is not immoral as 
such, to the categorical condition of legitimacy. This attitude is only 
genuinely moral when it is adopted out of a disinterested recognition of the 
dignity of other persons, rather than out of the calculated expectation of a 
personal advantage. Legitimacy is warranted when one’s behavior conforms 
to norms that are universalizable, i.e., norms that can in principle be 
accepted by everyone. Put differently, a choice is legitimate when it can be 
justified before all those potentially affected by its consequences. This 
justification can be thought of as a universal approval by an unlimited 
communicative community (Habermas 1983: 99). 
This criterion of legitimacy is not to be understood as requiring a 
factual consensus in a real discourse. Rather, it is meant as a regulative idea, 
i.e., an ideal type situation that merely provides the “moral point of view” 
(Baier 1958), rather than a “social technology” that generates solutions to 
Johannes Hirata                       
 
 
713
 
moral problems (Ulrich 1998a: 11). This lack of concreteness may be 
criticized, but then this very lack is a characteristic of ethics itself and merely 
reflects its indeterminacy, and the feat of discourse ethics of having 
developed a firmly reasoned moral point of view must not be 
underestimated. In fact, any ethical theory offering a deterministic ethical 
formula that can always tell right from wrong would promise more than 
may, and should, be expected. 
In short, morality thus understood is not about altruism or selflessness. 
Rather, it requires that one voluntarily subordinates one’s interests and 
actions to the criterion of legitimacy by ensuring that one respects the rights 
of all others in one’s pursuit of one’s interests. Seen from another angle, it 
requires that the norms of one’s behavior be universalizable in the sense that 
they can be accepted, or enjoyed, by everybody equally. 
Under this view, what is right and wrong depends ultimately on 
people’s free judgment of what they find justifiable or rejectable, and 
therefore on their free choices. Consequently, a moral discourse, even an 
imaginary one, is not merely a means to find a pre-existing moral solution 
that is just waiting to be discovered like the solution to a mathematical 
equation. It is rather through the discourse itself that it is established what is 
and is not legitimate. After all, the very act of taking a genuine interest in 
others’ rights—a characteristic of any discourse worth its name—is itself 
constitutive of, though not sufficient for, moral actions. 
Providing merely a formal principle defining the moral point of view, 
rather than a catalogue of norms or values, discourse ethics seems to be less 
vulnerable to accusations of culture-dependence. In fact, for an objection 
against discourse ethics—whether voiced from within a culture or out of a 
different cultural context—to be an objection at all, i.e., to be a reasoned 
critique rather than a mere statement, it has to invoke precisely those norms 
that are explicated by discourse ethics. The only way to escape this 
“forceless force” (Habermas 1981: 47) is to refuse the discourse altogether 
which would identify the speaker as a moral fundamentalist who thereby 
places himself outside the moral community. Except for such 
fundamentalist convictions, however, discourse ethics indeed seems to 
describe the proper, universal “moral point of view” irrespective of cultural 
specificities. 
Happiness and Economic Affluence 
Empirical happiness research has produced a remarkable body of 
evidence on the relationship between economic affluence and happiness. 
Yet, except for a few neat results, the overall picture is rather heterogeneous 
and difficult to interpret. In a nutshell, what has become clear is that, within 
any given society with some degree of income inequality, the poorest 20 or 
30 percent are significantly less happy (in terms of SWB) than the upper 70 
or 80 percent of the income distribution. It is also well-documented that at a 
 Putting Gross National Happiness in the Service of Good Development: From  
Ethics to Politics   
714 
given point in time, rich nations tend to be more happy than poorer ones, 
even though this seems to be true only up to some threshold level in the 
order of magnitude of US$10,000 annual per capita income, and even far 
below this value one finds positive outliers with levels of happiness that are 
also found in very rich countries. On the other hand, there is little evidence 
that nations become happier as they get richer over time. While there are 
virtually no data for developing countries—which limits the potential for 
generalization—, the data series coming closest to witnessing the escape 
from poverty is that of Japan beginning in 1958 which shows no significant 
upward trend over more than thirty years. 
Three major effects can explain the bulk of these observations. First, the 
happiness deficit of the poorer segments within a society and the failure of 
average SWB to rise with average incomes are to a large extent due to a 
“secondary inflation” effect (Hirata 2001: 36) that reduces the value, in terms 
of “functionings” (Sen 1980/1983), of a given consumption level (i.e., a level 
that is constant in terms of a representative basket of goods) as a society 
grows richer. For example, growing car ownership often leads to a 
deterioration of public transport services which means that those people 
whose real incomes fail to rise with those of the majority will end up being 
worse off (i.e., in terms of the functioning of mobility), and that the 
possession of a car partly reflects a new necessity rather than the satisfaction 
of a genuine desire. More fundamentally, the functioning of social 
participation depends to a substantial degree on relative income. Socializing 
is simply more expensive in rich societies than in poor ones, and it may be 
doubted whether the additional money spent on social activities buys an 
increase in happiness. “In a poor society a man proves to his wife that he 
loves her by giving her a rose but in a rich society he must give a dozen 
roses” (Layard 1980: 741). 
Second, people appear to get used to the new comforts brought about 
by rising consumption standards, but they frequently fail to anticipate this 
“hedonic adaptation” (Loewenstein & Schkade 1999). As a consequence 
they spend money on goods that have only a temporary effect on happiness, 
and too little on goods that would yield lasting happiness. Empirical 
evidence for hedonic adaptation is overwhelming (Loewenstein & Schkade 
1999). 
Third and most important in this context, on a social level consumption 
is largely a zero-sum game in terms of happiness. Even in the case of 
consumption goods that are not subject to hedonic adaptation, their 
happiness effect may be annihilated as soon as others can afford the same 
good. This is either because the increase in demand leads to congestion 
effects (e.g. holidays on a remote beach) or because the source of satisfaction 
consists precisely in being ahead of the crowd (e.g. the satisfaction from 
having a superior social status). To the extent consumption takes place in 
such a competition for “positional goods” (Hirsch 1976: 11), individually 
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rational decisions will result in a socially wasteful allocation of resources, 
just as standing on tiptoe in a theater will improve each one’s view 
individually but not lead to a better view for the audience as a whole. As 
Hirsch (1976) and, more recently, Frank (1999) convincingly argue, 
positional competition is a pervasive phenomenon in affluent societies. 
However, despite these three effects, some hope remains. Not all ways 
of spending money are subject to the secondary inflation effect, hedonic 
adaptation, or positional competition. Relief from the stress of driving 
through dense traffic, regular physical exercise, noise abatement, and 
freeing up time to socialize with friends are empirically confirmed examples 
for transforming resources into happiness that neither wears off over time 
(at least not entirely) nor depends on relative position (Frank 1999: 81ff). 
On the whole, the evidence on the relationship between wealth and 
happiness strongly suggests that it is not governed by a mechanical 
quantitative law but that it is above all the quality and not the quantity of 
consumption that has an impact on how satisfied a society is. To be sure, 
SWB requires at least the satisfaction of life-sustaining needs and certainly 
some degree of material comfort beyond that. Yet, this still leaves a large 
range of income levels and consumption standards which offer the 
potential, but no guarantee, for pervasive happiness. 
Nothing of this is to say that economic growth is per se undesirable. In 
a modern market economy operating on international markets, a failure to 
grow at the same pace as one’s trading partners will most likely be 
associated with rising unemployment which in turn breeds unhappiness. It 
would miss the point, though, to propose a stimulation of economic growth 
in order to contain unemployment because, depending on the perspective 
adopted, economic stagnation can be seen as either the cause or the 
consequence of unemployment. In the latter perspective, a reduction of 
unemployment will automatically result in economic growth whenever 
technological progress takes place. The point is that focusing on economic 
growth is less plausible as a policy objective (at least for affluent economies) 
than focusing on reducing unemployment. When confronted with a choice 
between (A) stagnating GNP but full employment or (B) rising GNP but 
stagnating high unemployment (which would for example result from an 
extension of the work week), empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests 
that the former will be more conducive to SWB. 
Gross National Happiness and Good Development 
The recognition that economic growth is not per se a good thing has 
lead people to look for concepts that would better reflect human betterment. 
As a result of the ecological awakening in the early 1970s, attempts were 
made to adjust GNP for unaccounted costs in terms of lost natural capital 
and negative external effects, e.g., those caused by noxious fumes, on the 
quality of life. Being more concerned about poverty, the United Nations 
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Development Program (UNDP) designed the Human Development Index 
(HDI) that integrates GNP, longevity, and literacy data into a single figure. 
Both initiatives were, and continue to be, important correctives to the 
obsession with GNP, but, as will be argued below (0), they remain deficient 
because they remain committed to a one-dimensional (utilitarian) concept of 
good development. 
A much more profound shift of perspective was made by His Majesty 
the IV King of Bhutan when he declared Gross National Happiness to be the 
primary, though not exclusive, principle of the country’s development 
efforts without forcing that idea into a quantitative index. Since then, and 
especially since GNH has risen to international awareness, GNH has found 
many advocates. What these advocates claim is not merely that GNH 
should be adopted in order to achieve, say, happiness, i.e., if happiness 
happens to be one’s goal, but their claim is that GNH should be adopted 
because it is a better development concept, full stop. In other words—in 
Kant’s words actually—they do not make a hypothetical claim but a 
categorical one (Kant 1977/1785: 43), and this means they are making an 
ethical statement. 
To make such a statement, and to arrive at a favorable comparison of 
GNH vis-à-vis competing concepts (such as GNP), one must as a matter of 
logical necessity have some comparison criteria, some normative frame of 
reference which provides orientation between good and bad, right and 
wrong, just as a compass does between North and South. In the context of 
societal development, this frame of reference is implicit in the notion of 
good development. This is of course only a formal concept, a point of 
reference providing orientation and must not be mistaken for a concrete 
objective, or a utopia, that is to be accomplished. Similar to the ideal concept 
of a geometrically perfect circle that only exists as an idea and can never be 
found in the real world, good development stands for a criterion, a 
regulative idea, rather than for an objective. Different from a circle, 
however, it cannot be completely defined. As an ethical idea it is even 
ultimately indeterminate just as ethics itself (cf. p. 84). Hence, rather than 
being a weakness, this elusiveness of good development is just consistent 
with its role as representing the idea of the good itself. 
When I talk about development in this context, this is not to be 
understood merely as the process of eradicating hunger and abject poverty 
the so-called “developing countries” and neither as the economic catching 
up of these countries to the consumption levels of the high-income 
countries, but rather as the never-ending effort of all societies to narrow the 
gap between the actual and the potential goodness of social arrangements 
and of the well-being of citizens. With this understanding of development, 
all countries are and will always be developing countries. 
For good development to deserve its name, it must also be justifiable in 
a temporal and in a global perspective. It must not only be concerned with 
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the people currently living in a given society, it must also take into account 
the rights of future generations (temporal perspective) and those of other 
societies (global perspective). This is of course not an additional 
requirement but merely the consequent generalization of the idea of 
universalizability. Having said this, my intention is merely to flag these two 
dimensions as worth bearing in mind, but I will not be able to discuss them 
explicitly within the scope of this paper. 
So far and to my knowledge, the concept of GNH is defined only to a 
limited extent, namely by the four major goals of (1) economic self-reliance, 
(2) environmental preservation, (3) cultural promotion, and (4) good 
governance (Thinley 1999: 16). Moreover, it is usually seen as one principle 
next to others, not as the only principle of development, as expressed in the 
famous phrase by His Majesty the King, “Gross National Happiness is more 
important than Gross National Product” (Thinley 1999: 12-13) (rather than 
saying that GNH is the only objective of importance). And of course the 
term “happiness” speaks for itself and thereby fills the concept of GNH with 
substance, but again with some scope of interpretation as there is no 
universally accepted concept, let alone definition, of happiness. 
When going about to conceptualize GNH in what follows, I will 
therefore take as a starting point the following assumed consensus on the 
meaning of GNH: 
GNH comes with a moral claim to be conducive to good development. 
GNH is an (incomplete) catalogue of goals and priorities, with the four 
major objectives (as mentioned above) as its goals and with happiness as the 
first priority. 
GNH is not an ethically inclusive concept, i.e., it is not in itself 
sufficient to substantiate the idea of good development, but needs to be 
complemented by other principles. 
Apparently, GNH is essentially about allowing people to live well and 
to be happy. In philosophical terms, therefore, it is a teleological concept, 
one that is concerned with what is good (as opposed to right or just). Good 
development, however, must integrate the teleological perspective of the 
good life with the deontological perspective of legitimacy, otherwise it will 
remain incomplete. Put differently, good development not only needs a 
conception of what constitutes a good life (happiness, for example), it also 
needs principles that provide criteria to decide what is right when the good 
life, or the happiness, of one person conflicts with that of another. For 
example, if of two neighbors one finds happiness in silence and the other in 
listening to loud music, the principle of happiness does not provide any 
orientation of how this conflict of interest should be dealt with. 
In fact, there is a school of moral philosophy, namely utilitarianism, 
that does claim exactly this, that the criterion of happiness can also decide 
questions of legitimacy. In the principle of total utility maximization, 
utilitarianism claims to dispose of a criterion that tells right from wrong: 
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maximizing utility is right, anything falling short of utility maximization is 
wrong. In the example of the two neighbors, the volume should (not may, 
but should!) be turned up as long as the increase in the music lover’s 
happiness is larger than the loss in his neighbor’s happiness. (Of course 
these happiness increments cannot be precisely measured, but this can be 
regarded as a practical limitation of all moral criteria and no particular 
deficiency of utilitarianism.) Looking closer, however, it is evident that it is 
not happiness itself that provides the criteria of right and wrong, but the 
principle of maximization together with some more or less natural premises. 
This principle is problematic for at least three reasons. First it must 
presuppose that people have rather than choose their preferences (cf. p. 84). 
If, by contrast, people are assumed to have a free will, happiness 
maximization is simply not possible as a matter of logic—one cannot deduce 
determinate results from an indeterminate basis. 
Second, following directly from the rejection of a free will, people 
cannot be held accountable for their preferences. Imagine a poacher who 
would be prepared to pay a large amount of money to a community to be 
allowed to shoot the remaining snow leopards in their forests to take their 
furs home as trophies. Happiness maximization would demand that the 
poacher should be allowed to hunt down the snow leopards if the resulting 
total happiness rises as a result (ignoring the (un)happiness of the snow 
leopards of course). When people find this way of settling conflicts of 
interest outraging, it is because they do not, as utilitarianism does, take a 
person’s happiness as given and as beyond critical reflection. They would 
contend that the poacher can and should revise his preferences and that he 
should derive happiness from more benign purposes—and that otherwise 
he deserves to be denied that source of happiness even if that reduces the 
sum total of happiness. 
Third, people obviously care about more than happiness alone. For 
example, when a person forgoes an opportunity for personal happiness in 
order to honor a promise even though that does not bring her any 
significant benefit, then this person puts commitment before happiness (Sen 
1983). Saying that commitment is also a source of happiness and enters into 
her hedonistic calculus would again assume that the person has not herself 
chosen to want to commit herself, but that she just happens to have a 
preference for commitment. This kind of reasoning, however, would 
bereave the idea of commitment of its very essence—and the person of her 
personality. 
Rejecting happiness maximization is of course not the same as rejecting 
happiness as one policy objective among others embedded into a larger 
concept of good development. In particular, I would like to propose an 
interpretation of GNH where happiness fulfills two distinct roles: one as a 
teleological substantiation of good development, and the other as a heuristic 
device. 
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In its first role, happiness substantiates the formal concept of good 
development by specifying what it should primarily be about. In particular, 
it gives priority to mental well-being, to positive sentiments, and to a 
positive evaluation of one’s life to the degree these concepts are implied by 
the idea of happiness. In other words and recalling what has been said 
above (p. 84) about the nature of happiness, it focuses on allowing people to 
have reasons for contentment and happiness. While there are certainly some 
rather universal characteristics of happiness, each culture may give varying 
weights to the different aspects of happiness and emphasize additional 
qualities that would be part of a culture-specific understanding of 
happiness. In a Buddhist tradition, e.g., individual enlightenment, control of 
one’s desires, and freedom from excessive self-concern (Thinley 1999: 17-18) 
would perhaps play a central role. Singling out such a conception of 
happiness as a development priority contrasts with the traditional Western 
development paradigm which was driven by a deep-rooted ethos of 
industrious thriftiness that has been famously attributed to the “Protestant 
Ethic” by Max Weber (1975/1920). 
The importance of a society’s development paradigm, I would argue, 
seems to lie not primarily in its direct influence on political decisions, but in 
the impact it has on people—whether ordinary citizens or politicians—as an 
orientating principle. It provides or legitimizes rationales people invoke in 
designing institutions, in the reflection on their values, and even in their 
everyday decisions. At least, many decision rationales in the affluent 
Western societies seem difficult to explain if not by the prominence of GNP 
as the epitome of good development. 
In its second role, happiness can serve as a heuristic device within the 
concept of GNH to elucidate the subtle psychological and societal 
phenomena that drive a wedge between what people actually want and 
what eventually results from their decisions (as discussed above, pp. 84). 
Knowledge of these phenomena may allow the individual to make less 
decisions he will have to regret (because he fell into some psychological 
trap), and it may allow society to contain prisoners’ dilemmas by instilling 
in citizens a sense of collective interdependence, making the need for 
commitment to social norms more plausible to the individual. 
In either of these roles, GNH does not, and should not, play its role as a 
“user manual” for decision makers, but rather as a mental ferment that 
leads to better informed and more thoroughly reflected choices, private and 
collective, and as a proclamation of a societal consensus of value priorities 
that lends authority to the “soft” argument in favor of happiness. Thereby, 
happiness should enrich the deliberative process that should be taking place 
anyway, and in which decisions should be taken by the conscientious 
assessment of reasons rather than by maximizing a happiness function. 
The relationship between good development and GNH is therefore one 
between a formal principle and its concrete meaning in a specific context in 
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which people identify with a particular ethos. By giving substance to the 
concept of good development, it may be argued, GNH is itself already the 
first step of operationalizing good development. 
Operationalizing Gross National Happiness 
Even though GNH is more substantive than the formal concept of good 
development, it remains a rather ideal concept. Hence, if one wants to fix 
the way it is translated into consistent decision rationales that can be 
applied to concrete situations, GNH needs to be further operationalized. In 
fact, GNH has already been operationalized to some degree by the 
specification of the four major goals mentioned above (p. 84), but it remains 
unclear—at least in the literature I am aware of—through which ordering 
principles these goals relate to each other. In the first part of this section, 
therefore, I will try to delineate one possible ordering principle by 
examining the economic-liberal stance that good development, and perhaps 
happiness?, consist primarily or even exclusively in letting people choose 
individually for themselves free from collective restrictions and without 
questioning their choices. After laying out my objections against this view, I 
will propose an alternative maxim as the basis for operationalizing good 
development and will then revert to the four major goals of GNH. In the 
second part of this section I will briefly discuss the role indicators should 
play in the operationalization of GNH. 
Liberty and Happiness 
Proponents of the economic-liberal position basically make two distinct 
arguments. First, they posit that freedom of choice is of intrinsic value, i.e., 
valuable independent from the consequences this freedom has on welfare. 
Second, they believe that economic theory and common sense justify a far-
reaching trust (i) in each individual’s ability to make those choices which 
are in her best interest, and (ii) in an “invisible hand” (Adam Smith) that 
transforms uncoordinated individual choices into social welfare. 
Regarding the first point, it should be noted that saying of something 
to be of intrinsic value is not the same as saying that something has to be 
protected whatever the cost. For example, I may consider animals to possess 
intrinsic value, yet still approve of hunting for the purpose of keeping 
animal populations in balance if the killing of some animals is justified by 
reference to some other intrinsic value of more weight (such as the long-
term survival of the biotope). I could not, however, approve of hunting just 
for the fun of it because, in my view, hunting as a source of fun can perfectly 
be substituted by other activities that do not require to compromise on 
intrinsic value. In the language of Immanuel Kant, saying that something is 
of intrinsic value would mean that it shall “always at the same time be 
treated as an end and never only as a means” (Kant 1977/1785: 61), but not 
that it may never and under no circumstances be also put in the service of 
Johannes Hirata                       
 
 
721
 
another purpose of intrinsic value. In the context of free choice this means 
that I can acknowledge the intrinsic value of free choice, yet at the same 
time advocate selective limits to free choice where this is justified by other 
intrinsic benefits I consider more urgent. 
Regarding the second argument, I shall raise three more or less related 
objections against an unlimited trust in individual rationality and the 
invisible hand. 
(a) First, individuals appear to make systematic mistakes in predicting 
which choice will make them happiest. In addition to the well-established 
phenomenon of hedonic adaptation (cf. p.10), I will propose an argument by 
Norberg-Hodge (1991) that can be labeled the “seduction by modernity”-
hypothesis. Since her argument is based on anecdotal evidence and can 
therefore not be generalized, I will merely propose it without being in a 
position to defend it as a general phenomenon. Nevertheless, considering 
that she has closely witnessed the entire process of modernization in 
Ladakh—a region in North-West India which appears to share some 
important characteristics with Bhutan, at least until just a couple of decades 
ago—her narrative might be of relevance to the challenge of good 
development faced by Bhutan. 
Her argument basically is that the first contact with modern lifestyles 
by people in traditional societies, most often through the presence of 
Western tourists and television, instills an immense admiration of the 
achievements of modernity while concealing the downsides of economic 
progress. 
 
“For millions of youths in rural areas of the world, modern 
Western culture appears far superior to their own. It is not 
surprising since, looking as they do from the outside, all they can 
see is the material side of the modern world—the side in which 
Western culture excels. They cannot so readily see the social or 
psychological dimensions—the stress, the loneliness, the fear of 
growing old. Nor can they see environmental decay, inflation, or 
unemployment. On the other hand, they know their own culture 
inside out, including all its limitations and imperfections.” 
(Norberg-Hodge 1991: 97-98) 
 
People see the convenience of time-saving appliances—but not that 
competition for productivity increases the pace of life. They see that by 
earning money they can afford valued goods—but not that monetization 
threatens to undermine social relationships (cf. also Rhodes 2000). They see 
that work in the modern sector is less strenuous—but not that a sedentary 
lifestyle makes people prone to obesity and diseases of civilization. They see 
that a good education increases the chances of their children to get high-
paying jobs—but not that widespread schooling will separate children from 
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their parents and, if based on Western curricula, will alienate them from 
their own culture (cf. also Wangyal 2001). 
I hasten to emphasize that I am not implying that traditional life is 
always and in all respects better than modern life. Norberg-Hodge herself 
also acknowledges that modernity brings improvements too. Rather, the 
point is that people in traditional societies may have a biased perception of 
modern life, clearly seeing its blessings, but largely ignoring its dark sides. 
This may to some extent be due to a lack of information, but also to a 
systematic bias inherent in cognitive processes. For example, people 
typically fall prey to the “focusing illusion” (Schkade & Kahneman 1998), 
overstating the satisfaction they will derive from a specific change in their 
life simply because their attention is drawn to this particular life domain. By 
highlighting this bias in perception, I do not say that people should always 
decide against modern lifestyles, but merely that people’s decisions would 
better serve their authentic interests if the less visible effects of 
modernization were also appreciated. 
(b) My second objection concerns the trust in the efficiency of a 
benevolent invisible hand. To be sure, the market mechanism is often a 
highly efficient way to organize production and allocate goods, and there 
are good reasons to make use of this mechanism for the purpose of good 
development. However, to the degree people compete for positional goods 
and thus engage in a zero-sum game (cf. p. 11), the invisible hand may turn 
counterproductive. In this case, the market mechanism will lead a society to 
spend real resources on relocating goods among people (generally from 
those with little to those with much capital—intellectual, physical, or 
monetary), rather than on a net creation of value. From a social perspective, 
this is as wasteful as if, say, ten percent of theater visitors could buy the 
privilege to stand up during the performance. As theater visitors get richer, 
they would bid up prices without making any difference to the overall 
outcome. The analogy between society and the theater audience only breaks 
down in terms of membership: you can simply choose not to go to the 
theater, but you do not have that choice with respect to society. 
(c) My third objection concerns the trust in the justice of the invisible 
hand. Even though economic liberalists sometimes concede that the 
invisible hand is not perfectly just, they contend that its deficits in terms of 
justice are unimportant enough to be outweighed by its efficiency benefits. 
This view, I believe, is grossly inadequate. Rather, the invisible hand is 
better described as being indifferent towards matters of justice—it may lead 
to largely just outcomes under favorable conditions, but it is not by itself 
just. The main reason for this is that it hands out the economic product to 
each according to his bargaining power which is defined largely in terms of 
the relative scarcity of a person’s skills. A talented athlete, e.g., can 
accumulate sufficient money for the rest of his life before the age of 
twenty—provided his talent is relatively scarce (both in terms of supply of, 
Johannes Hirata                       
 
 
723
 
and demand for, his talent). A construction worker, on the other hand, will 
in his whole life not earn the equivalent of a world-class soccer player’s 
annual salary, even if he is the most diligent and skillful worker—simply 
because his skills are not scarce enough since there are (too many) others 
around who could replace him. The observation that this effect tends to 
reward effort—an essential demand of distributive justice—and leads to 
efficiency-enhancing incentives for people to develop valued (i.e., scarce) 
skills may justify a degree of distributive injustice, but it does not grant an 
all-out absolution from a concern for justice. Rather, markets with their 
efficiency-enhancing properties should be put in the service of a normative 
conception of good development and, consequently, find their limits where 
they lead to a degree of distributive injustice that can no longer be justified. 
In other words, justice should be a matter of moral criteria that determine 
the domain and the form of the market, not the other way round. 
The criticism raised here against the economic-liberal view is in fact a 
criticism at a specific economistic (Ulrich 1998b: 15) interpretation of 
liberalism which reduces the idea of freedom to “freedom of choice” in the 
sense of protecting people from intrusion into their individual choices 
(“negative freedom”). Another reading of the idea of freedom, by contrast, 
would be “freedom to choose”, namely to choose a dignified, fulfilling way 
of life (“positive freedom” or “real freedom”). In this interpretation, 
freedom may not only require protection from undue intrusion, but also the 
active empowerment of the disadvantaged to enable them to actually 
choose a dignified way of life, rather than condemning them to make do 
with whatever the economy happens to leave for them. 
This republican-liberalist (Ulrich 1998b: 295) view differs in at least 
three important respects from the economic-liberal one. 
First, it does not take for granted that people will always make choices 
which are in their best interest. Neither, however, does it seek to prescribe, 
or even enforce, specific choices or values (an ambition economic liberalists 
are fond of imputing to any alternative to their own position). It merely 
includes the formation of preferences and choices into its field of interest by 
asking for the conditions which enable people to actually make choices 
which are in their best interest. 
Second, and this is the specifically republican element of this 
conception of liberalism, it expects from all citizens to enjoy their freedoms 
as responsible members of a res publica (from Latin for “public affair”). In 
contrast to economic liberalism which seeks to isolate the individual from 
moral obligations and attempts to justify this by hinting to the efficiency of 
an ideal economic order, republican liberalism expects from each citizen a 
commitment to the res publica, i.e., the willingness to subordinate one’s 
private interests to the condition of public legitimacy (Ulrich 1998b: 299). 
More concretely, a republican citizen would not, e.g., recklessly take full 
advantage of her superior bargaining power vis-à-vis the economically 
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disadvantaged—even where the conceivably best economic order legally 
entitles her to do so. Moreover, she would not regard this as a constraint to 
her freedom, but rather as naturally following from her identity as part of 
the res publica. She simply would not want to benefit unduly at the expense 
of others. In other words, each citizen is called upon to regard economic 
interaction not as a space free of morality but as part of the moral space that 
includes all human interaction, and to treat the other members of society not 
as opponents in a bargaining contest but as co-citizens of a shared res 
publica and as moral subjects which are to be respected in exercising one’s 
own freedom. 
Third, republican liberalism considers restrictions on individual 
choices to be justified when these restrictions are themselves the 
manifestation of free choices, i.e., when they are democratically legitimized. 
For example, the wide-spread practice of mandatory pension saving 
schemes is obviously a restriction on people’s choices, but it is a restriction 
most people advocate in order to collectively control their spending 
behavior which they apparently feel would otherwise not be in their best 
interest. Put differently, a populace can voluntarily choose to put in place 
restrictions on their choices without becoming an illiberal society for that 
reason. 
The concept of republican liberalism does not imply any specific design 
of the economic order and of people’s liberties. Rather, it conceives of 
freedom in a positive mode rather than merely as the absence of 
interference, and argues that people’s choices need to be preceded by a 
fundamental reflection in two dimensions. In the individual dimension, the 
reflection should consist in a critical examination of one’s preferences in the 
light of the full consequences of different development paths. There can be 
little doubt, e.g., that parents’ choices with respect to their children’s 
education will be better after they have examined the “seduction by 
modernity”-hypothesis, no matter if that examination actually changes their 
choices. In the social dimension, the reflection should consist in a public 
moral discourse about the legal and institutional provisions that are most 
conducive to good development. A truly liberal society may prefer to 
impose some constraints on freedom of choice in order to give people 
freedom to choose and in order to avoid wasting resources on positional rat 
races, rather than, in blind trust in the benevolence of an invisible hand, 
deliver people to the vagaries of unfettered competition. 
Of course, people can usually be assumed to already reflect on the 
wider implications of their choices without needing instruction to do so. 
However, important aspects of one’s choices’ consequences—especially 
when leading to an entirely novel way of life—may simply not be obvious 
and will therefore not be adequately taken into account. Furthermore, it 
would be naïve to assume an unlimited human capacity to cope with 
fundamental social change. Here, governments can play the role of 
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stimulating the circulation of balanced, or (counter-)balancing, information; 
encouraging reflection on specific issues; facilitating public discourse; and 
strengthening initiatives of civil society (Galay 2001). 
Coming back now to the four major goals of GNH: economic self-
reliance, environmental preservation, cultural promotion, and good 
governance, the question arises how these rather specific goals relate to the 
concept of republican liberalism that has been proposed here as an ordering 
principle for the operationalization of the concept of GNH. 
First of all, a crucial distinction should be made between the nature of 
concrete goals and ethical principles. While goals may be better or worse, 
more or less important, and may be achieved in good or bad ways, ethical 
principles are neither good or bad (because a bad ethical principle is no 
ethical principle at all), but rather right or wrong (i.e., more or less well-
argued). In other words, while goals are the objects of ethical judgments, 
ethical principles provide the moral point of view from which to make these 
judgments. Both are complementary, of course: While goals remain devoid 
of value unless they are evaluated by means of ethical principles, ethical 
principles have merely formal character until they are related to concrete 
goals (cf. the distinction between the teleological and the deontological 
perspectives above on p. 84). Thus, the four major goals of GNH may serve 
the purpose of emphasizing certain issues of particular importance, but they 
need to be complemented by (deontological) ethical principles that provide 
the criteria to judge, e.g., to which degree economic self-reliance shall be 
pursued; at which cost to human well-being the environment should be 
preserved; or how far cultural promotion may go in constraining individual 
liberties. For the task of operationalizing the concept of GNH, this means 
that the ultimate point of reference from which to evaluate the 
operationalization of GNH is not the concept of GNH itself, but again an 
inclusive ideal concept of good development. Happiness may be the 
paramount objective in this conception of good development, but it must 
also always remain embedded in the latter. 
Another way of focusing attention on specific aspects of good 
development is the selection of appropriate indicators, which shall be 
explored in the following sub-section. 
Measuring Happiness? 
The apparent allusion of the expression “Gross National Happiness” to 
the conventional concept of “Gross National Product” suggests that now 
“happiness” should be measured in Bhutan just as “product” is measured in 
most other countries. One would simply have to take the average of the 
population’s SWB scores in order to arrive at a “per capita GNH”-indicator 
that would replace the indicator of “per capita GNP”. Recent advances in 
the methodology of happiness measurement, one might argue, would 
warrant a sufficient degree of precision and validity. A substantial minority 
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of Kuensel online readers seem to agree: in a recent poll (December 2003), 36 
percent (n=439) answered in the affirmative when asked whether “GNH, a 
developmental philosophy, [can] be economically quantified.” 
A likely candidate for the quantification of happiness is of course the 
concept of subjective well-being (p. 84) since it rests on a firm empirical 
methodology. Yet, while SWB would certainly be a better indicator than 
GNP because it is about an intrinsically and not only instrumentally 
valuable objective, any single-index “super indicator” of social well-being, 
no matter if GNP, SWB, HDI (p. 84), or yet another concept, will be 
reductionist in that it reduces a multi-dimensional and indeterminate 
judgment to a single, ostensibly objective figure. More often than not, once 
an indicator has come to be recognized as the highest-order indicator of 
good development, it soon is identified with good development itself and its 
maximization elevated to the ultimate objective. Such a view quickly 
transforms a perhaps sensible rule of thumb (“raising indicator X tends to 
be good”) into an unquestioned doctrine (“good development consists in 
raising X”). The indicator in question then becomes the substitute of 
conscientious deliberation, rather than its content. In the case of GNH, a 
particular risk consists in the possibility that the concept of GNH one day 
comes to be appropriated by a hedonist (i.e, solipsist; cf. p. 84) and 
utilitarian understanding of happiness, in which case the original spiritual 
and moral dimension of GNH would be lost. 
In operationalizing GNH one should therefore perhaps refrain from 
formulating a single-index indicator and instead rely on a variety of 
separate indicators that capture various aspects of people’s daily lives that 
are much more relevant to good development, and in particular to 
happiness, than is GNP. Examples for such indicators would be 
malnutrition, health, mental depression, suicide, youth delinquency, 
alcoholism, drug abuse, and divorce rates, just to name a few. Such a 
heterogeneous (i.e., not aggregated) set of social indicators would 
underscore the view that even the most meaningful indicators provide just 
inconclusive pieces of information which need to be evaluated along moral 
criteria and cannot replace moral deliberation. This is all the more evident in 
the context of sustainability and global justice. A steep rise of happiness 
indicators, for example, will have to be assessed very carefully when it is 
based on unsustainable trends or on the exploitation of other countries. In 
short, to make sense of social indicators, they always need to be embedded 
into a wider moral discourse. 
The deliberate selection, and propagation, of social indicators seems to 
be more than an academic ivory tower-exercise. Casual observation 
suggests that those indicators that dominate newspaper headlines, TV news, 
and education curricula have a tremendous impact on both political and 
private priorities. If European newspaper headlines were dominated by 
indicators of subjective well-being, child poverty, and divorce rates, instead 
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of by GNP and Dow Jones trends, the political agenda and presumably even 
private priorities might be a bit more concerned with qualitative rather than 
with quantitative development. By analogy, if the concept of GNH is 
properly specified and continues to be the guiding principle—but not the 
doctrine—of Bhutan’s development vision, it can play an invaluable role in 
positioning the right indicators into newspaper headlines and thereby 
directing public discourse and private concerns towards those aspects of life 
that are constitutive elements of good development. 
There is nevertheless a strategic case for the formulation and 
publication of a single-index indicator since it is so much more convenient 
to communicate, especially across mass media, and so much more effective 
in catching people’s attention. Realistically reckoning with the role of mass 
media and politicians’ perceived need for simple messages, one must 
therefore assume that highest-order indicators of good development will 
always remain in circulation. The question then becomes not what would be 
the perfect indicator, because that would mean the rejection of any 
candidate, but which indicator would be less inappropriate than the 
incumbent top-indicator in most minds which currently is GNP. To topple 
GNP and replace it with a more humane indicator, therefore, one needs to 
look for “a measure … of the same level of vulgarity as GNP—just one 
number—but a measure that is not as blind to social aspects of human lives 
as GNP is,” as the spiritual father of the HDI, the former UNDP director 
Mahbub ul Haq, demanded (Sen 1999: 23). If one rejects a crude single-index 
measure of happiness because it is not perfect, one may end up with an 
even worse indicator. The challenge is to catch attention with a single-index 
indicator and at the same time highlight its deficiencies so as to stimulate a 
moral discourse on the content of happiness within a comprehensive 
concept of good development. 
Conclusion 
Happiness seems to provide an especially promising perspective to 
approach the challenge of development facing Bhutan. By adopting Gross 
National Happiness as its overarching development concept, Bhutan speaks 
out loud in favor of a people-centered perspective on development. 
In this paper I have made a number of diverse points, and I shall 
conclude by synthesizing them into five statements. 
Happiness is Inseparable From the Reasons for Happiness 
In contrast to the means/end metaphor where happiness is the only 
end of intrinsic value and all other objectives have merely instrumental 
value, happiness should be seen as a symptom indicating that a person has 
reason to be happy. In this perspectives, the person cares not only about his 
positive mental experience but also about the reasons themselves which are 
of intrinsic value. 
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Happiness is Something People Make Happen 
If we recognize that people have a free will, it follows that happiness is 
only to some extent dependent on objective life circumstances. Ultimately, 
people can be happy or unhappy in a large variety of settings. A person can 
be happy with her material possessions either because she has much or 
because she desires little. Thus, to attain happiness, it would be foolish for a 
society to focus exclusively on life circumstances and neglect the inner 
foundation for happiness. Bhutan’s Buddhist heritage might be a 
particularly strong source for instilling, or preserving, a foundation of this 
kind. 
Gross National Happiness is a Substantiation of the Ideal 
Concept of Good Development 
An approval of GNH is always made by implicit or explicit reference to 
the regulative idea of good development. Being a formal concept, good 
development needs to be substantiated by more specific concepts if it shall 
guide decisions, and happiness may be an especially appropriate candidate 
to serve as such a concept. 
Good Development is More Than Gross National Happiness 
As a teleological concept, happiness does not entirely fill out the formal 
concept of good development. In particular, it fails to address the dimension 
of legitimacy, i.e., it does not provide any criteria of how to deal with 
conflicts of interest. It therefore has to be complemented by deontological 
ethical principles 
Good Development Consists in Giving People Freedom to Choose 
Rather than Freedom of Choice 
Economic liberalism propagates the maxim that good development 
consists in protecting people’s freedom of choice. They fail to see, however, 
that people’s free choices may be more or less informed and better or worse 
reflected. Furthermore, a society may decide to restrict people’s freedom of 
choice in order to enhance people’s freedom to choose, without therefore 
becoming an illiberal society. In this view, the economy should not be left to 
take care of itself, but rather be embedded into society. It’s efficiency 
potential should become the servant of development rather than its 
purpose. 
Gross National Happiness makes a valuable first step towards 
operationalizing the notion of good development by selecting as the prime 
goal of development human well-being rather than material opulence. It is 
exactly in this role that the concept of GNH is particularly well positioned to 
be put in the service of good development. 
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